RSS-based secret key generation for indoor and outdoor WBANs using on-body sensor nodes by Castel, Thijs et al.
RSS-based Secret Key Generation for Indoor and
Outdoor WBANs using On-Body Sensor Nodes





Abstract—Given that the market of wearables is in so-called
hypergrowth mode, more and more of these on-body devices will
interact with each other. These body-to-body, device-to-device
links should not only provide reliable but also secure commu-
nication of personal user data. Therefore, we have analyzed the
potential of using the unique reciprocal body-to-body channel
between two legitimate parties, to create a high-level security
key that is unknown to an eavesdropper. Both randomly moving
legitimate parties, typically called Alice and Bob, were equipped
with low-power wireless on-body sensor nodes, which collect the
Received Signal Strength values. Additionally, the eavesdropper
Eve, who is continuously sniffing the body-to-body channel using
a third sensor node, collects her own sequence of RSS values,
which are expected to be highly decorrelated from the RSS values
from both Alice and Bob. Based on a statistical analysis, applied
to Received Signal Strength values to verify the correlation,
entropy and mutual information, the body-to-body link seems
very suitable for RSS-based secret key generation in indoor and
outdoor Wireless Body Area Networks. Moreover, this practical
and lightweight alternative for secret key generation ensures
low on-chip complexity and, hence, low computational power
consumption.
I. INTRODUCTION
In the near future, people will be connected to the internet
through multiple wearables which could autonomously com-
municate personal data towards desired recipients, creating
the Internet of People (IoP) [1], [2]. These new Wireless
Body Area Networks (WBANs) will go hand in hand with
the Internet of Things (IoT) concerning healthcare, fitness
monitoring and lifestyle computing [3]. Of course, for users’
safety and privacy, data protection is necessary to prevent that
intruders could access personal, and hence, sensitive data when
wireless data transfer is in progress. Moreover, since power
consumption is crucial for on-body devices, the proposed
secret key generation algorithm should require low compu-
tational complexity with limited memory size and bandwidth
[4]. Therefore, the unique characteristics of the underlying re-
ciprocal body-to-body channel between two mobile legitimate
parties are exploited to generate joint randomness between
both.
We have performed several mobile body-to-body (Alice-
to-Bob and vice versa) measurements at indoor and outdoor
locations, with a passive stationary eavesdropper (Eve) in the
vicinity of both Alice and Bob. The legitimate parties, Alice
and Bob, are equipped with low-power wireless nodes, placed
upon the human body, to set up autonomous communication
towards each other. Moreover, we assume that the passive
eavesdropper, represented by a third wireless node, is only
capable of calculating the Received Signal Strength (RSS)
from intercepted packets sent by Alice or Bob. If Alice
transmits a packet towards Bob and Bob retransmits a packet
towards Alice within the coherence time of a fast fluctuating
wireless body-to-body channel, the RSS at Alice and Bob
is expected to be approximately equal owing to reciprocity.
In contrast, the RSS at the eavesdropper is expected to be
significantly different or decorrelated from the quasi-equal
RSS values received by Alice and/or Bob. These unique
streams of RSS values at both legitimate parties could further
be used to generate a secret key, which is unknown for an
intruder. The collected RSS sequences are suitable for secret
key generation if the entropy and the Mutual Information (MI)
between both legitimate parties are high, whereas the mutual
information between a legitimate user and an eavesdropper
should be low. For an intruder, this complicates deciphering the
secret key and, hence, maximizes data security. Therefore, we
have analyzed the correlation, entropy and mutual information
of all collected RSS sequences, for three indoor and four
outdoor measurement scenarios, indicating the potential to use































Fig. 1. Measurement principle. The value RSSAB and the transmission from
Alice to Eve that includes RSSBA are only included for measurement purposes































Fig. 2. Outdoor measurement location and measurement scenario 1b. The top left photo, included to provide more insight into the outdoor measurent location,
was taken by Alice during measurement scenario 1b. Note that the on-body sensor node is covered by Bob’s jacket
To the authors’ best knowledge, this is the first work
where fully-autonomous low-power nodes were placed upon
the human body for RSS-based secret key generation, between
two moving legitimate parties in the presence of a stationary
eavesdropper, and where the quality of the key was validated
based on indoor and outdoor measurements. Despite the fact
that this is a relative new research domain, J. Jenssen et al.
have already presented interesting work concerning secret key
generation based on RSS values, albeit not in a body-centric
context. Linked to our work, [5] explores the effectiveness
of using highly reconfigurable antennas to generate varying
channels which are used to establish secret encryption keys.
Additionally, [6] shows that sufficient (and random) movement
is necessary to generate high entropy keys between two mobile
devices.
The paper is further organized as follows. Section 2 de-
scribes the measurement setup, scenario and location, Section
3 presents the statistical results and Section 4 summarizes the
main conclusions. Finally, in Section 5, we outline potential fu-
ture work since this work is only the (fundamental) beginning
of RSS-based secret key generation for indoor and outdoor
WBANs using on-body sensor nodes.
II. MEASUREMENT SETUP
Wireless on-body sensor nodes, composed of a dual-
polarized textile patch antenna that serves as a platform for the
flexible electronic circuits, were deployed on the bodies of test
persons [7]. The on-body sensor nodes placed upon Alice and
Bob operated fully-autonomous while Eve’s on-body sensor
nodes was connected to a laptop, which was used as the central
storage for all RSS values of one measurement: RSS from
Alice to Bob (RSSAB), RSS from Bob to Alice (RSSBA), RSS
from Alice to Eve (RSSAE) and RSS from Bob to Eve (RSSBE).
As visualized in Fig. 1, the dedicated embedded software was
programmed as follows:
1) Alice transmit a packet towards Bob who calculates
RSSAB. Moreover, the packet is also received by Eve
who calculates (and saves) RSSAE.
2) Bob retransmits a packet towards Alice, who calculates
RSSBA, and he includes, only for measurement purposes
and not in the actual application, RSSAB. Additionally,
the retransmitted packet is received by Eve, who cal-
culates RSSBE and saves both RSSBE and the included
RSSBA on the laptop.
3) For measurement purposes only and not in the actual
application, Alice retransmit a packet which includes
RSSBA towards Eve, who stores this value on the laptop.
Of course, in real-life scenarios, Alice and Bob do not
(re)transmit packets which include RSSAB or RSSBA because
the secret key generation is based on these unique values.
However, since only Eve could save the RSS values on the
laptop, this was necessary for measurement purposes.
Three measurement scenarios, with legitimate parties Alice
and Bob simultaneously moving around in the presence of
a stationary eavesdropper Eve, were performed at an indoor
and outdoor location. At the indoor office location, a lot of
potential reflectors and scatterers were present in the close
vicinity of Alice, Bob and Eve. In contrast, at the urban
outdoor location, all three parties were surrounded by high
buildings, on the one side, and high townhouses, at the
opposite side of the river, as shown in Fig. 2. In the first and
second scenario, Alice and Bob, randomly moving around,
remained in Line-of-Sight (LoS) of each other, as shown in













































Fig. 3. Measurement scenarios 1, 2 and 3, for both the indoor and outdoor measurement locations. Note that outdoor scenario 1b is depicted in Fig. 2.
Alice and Bob whereas, in the second scenario, Eve is at a
Non-Line-of-Sight (NLoS) position from Alice and Bob. In
the third scenario, Eve is visible to both Alice and Bob, who
do not see each other. Furthermore, one additional outdoor
measurement, corresponding to scenario 1b as shown in Fig.
2, was performed with Alice and Bob, being in each other’s
LoS, randomly moving around at the opposite side of the river
with a Line-of-Sight link towards Eve.
For one measurement scenario, we gathered one set of four
RSS values every 100 milliseconds for a total of 15.000 sets of
RSS values. If the received RSS value, further digitized in an 8
bit value, was below the detection limit of the on-body sensor,
the value was dropped and a new packet was sent by Alice to
gather 15.000 reliable sets of RSS values. Note that the delay
between transmission from Alice and retransmission from Bob
was only 5 milliseconds, and hence within the coherence time
of the channel, which is equal to 10 milliseconds.
III. RESULTS
A. Envelope Correlation
To create a highly-reliable security key from the RSS values,
the envelope correlation ρ between RSSAB and RSSBA should
be high whereas the signal strengths, received by Eve, should
be sufficiently decorrelated from RSSAB and RSSBA.
With X and Y, being vectors containing 15.000 RSS sam-
ples (in dBm), the envelope correlation is calculated as
ρX,Y =
E(X · Y)− E(X)E(Y)√[
E(X2)− (E(X))2][E(Y2)− (E(Y))2] . (1)
As seen in Table I, which presents the envelope correlation
ρ for all measurement scenarios at both the indoor and outdoor
measurement locations, the correlation between AB-BA is sig-
nificantly higher than the correlation with RSS values received
by Eve. This indicates that the received signal strength values





Fig. 4. Level Crossing Rate (LCR) for the Alice-to-Bob link
At the indoor measurement location, a large number of
potential reflectors are in the close proximity of Alice and Bob.
In contrast, at the outdoor locations, the potential scatterers
contributing to the received signal at Alice or Bob are further
away from both legitimate parties. This implies that, when
both Alice and Bob are simultaneously and randomly moving
around, the indoor body-to-body channel could vary faster,
compared to the outdoor body-to-body channel. For the Alice-
Bob link, this is verified by means of the Level Crossing
Rate (LCR), as visualized in Figure 4. Additionally, the faster
varying indoor body-to-body links decrease the coherence time
and, hence, increase the probability that RSSAB and RSSBA
exhibit, to a small extent, more decorrelation within the round-
trip time between Alice and Bob. Moreover, when focusing on
the indoor measurements, the correlation between RSSAB and
RSSBA is the smallest for scenario 3, because of the faster
varying channel, compared to scenarios 1 and 2, as shown
in Fig. 4. Given the NLoS link between Alice and Bob in
scenario 3, the correlation with Eve is somewhat higher at
both the indoor and outdoor locations, because communication
between Alice and Bob only happens via reflectors, which
may be in the close vicinity of Eve. Additionally, for outdoor
scenarios 1 and 3, the correlation between AB-AE (and BA-
AE) is unexpectedly higher than the correlation between AB-
BE (and BA-BE). This could be caused by the fact that,
during the (non-perfect) random walks, Bob was regularly
standing closer to Eve, compared to Alice. This increases
correlation between the Alice-Eve link and the Bob-Alice (and
vice versa) link. However, the correlation is still significantly
lower than the correlation between Alice and Bob. In contrast,
this phenomenon is not noticeable for scenario 1b where the
distances Eve-Alice and Eve-Bob were approximately equal




1 2 3 1 1b 2 3
AB-BA 0.878 0.912 0.704 0.970 0.975 0.968 0.984
BA-AE 0.032 -0.039 0.144 0.269 0.059 -0.042 0.390
BA-BE 0.044 0.034 0.141 0.077 0.099 -0.073 0.152
AB-AE 0.031 -0.037 0.138 0.270 0.062 -0.040 0.391
AB-BE 0.051 0.020 0.124 0.078 0.063 -0.073 0.149
AE-BE -0.050 -0.024 0.004 -0.063 -0.024 0.039 -0.064
B. Entropy
The entropy indicates how many bits of the 8 bit RSS value










In an ideal situation, all RSS values, within the detection
range of the receiver, have equal probability for every consecu-
tive measurement. Theoretically, this corresponds to maximum
entropy equal to 8 bits. For the on-body sensors nodes, the
detection limit is equal to -95 dBm whereas the saturation
limit equals -35 dBm. This sets the maximal entropy equal
to log2(60) = 5.90 bits, when all RSS values would have
the same probability. However, since we are performing real-
life measurements, the Most Significant Bits (MSBs) of the 8
bit RSS value will vary slower than the Least Significant Bit
(LSBs), and are therefore more predictable. This implies that
data, secured with these MSBs, is easier to decipher by an
eavesdropper. Therefore, the bits that do not vary fast enough
over time are not used to generate secret keys. The calculated
entropy, presented in Table II, shows that H(X) ∈ [4.765,





1 2 3 1 1b 2 3
AB 5.248 5.391 4.765 5.551 5.796 5.633 5.297
BA 5.234 5.399 4.782 5.547 5.790 5.637 5.295
Table II also indicates smaller entropy when Alice and Bob
are inside. As described before, at the indoor measurement
location, a large number of possible reflectors are in the close
proximity of Alice and Bob. Moreover, these reflectors are
not only present on few specific locations, as for the outdoor
scenario, but over the full 360◦ range around Alice and Bob.
This implies that, during most of the time, many multipath
components contribute to the RSS values, at Alice or Bob,
which leads to a narrower RSS distribution for the indoor
measurement scenario, as visualized in Fig. 5 for measurement
scenario 3. In contrast, the potential reflectors at the outdoor
measurement locations are not equally distributed around Alice
and Bob. This implies that the RSS values could fluctuate
more, heavily depending on the orientation of both Alice and
Bob, because the number of arriving multipaths varies over
time. This leads to a broader RSS range, as visualized in Fig.
5, and, hence, a higher entropy.
Fig. 5. RSS distribution for scenario 3 at both the indoor and outdoor
measurement location
C. Mutual Information
Next to the correlation and the entropy, the mutual infor-
mation is the third statistical parameter which indicates the
potential strength of a secret key. The MI depends on the






P (Xi,Yj) · log2
(
P (Xi,Yj)
P (Xi) · P (Yj)
)
. (3)
The mutual information indicates how many information
bits of the 8 bit RSSAB can be estimated if the 8 bit RSSBA
value is known, or vice versa. It measures how the knowledge
of RSSAB reduces uncertainity about RSSBA. Similar to the
correlation, the mutual information should be high between
RSSAB and RSSBA and low between RSSAB,BA and a potential
eavesdropper. However, only a high correlation is not sufficient
to guarantee high-level secret key. The combination of high
correlation and low entropy, as for static body-to-body mea-
surements, results in low MI. In contrast, if both the correlation
and entropy are high, the mutual information is high, as for




1 2 3 1 1b 2 3
AB-BA 1.398 1.572 0.667 2.386 2.535 2.440 3.053
BA-AE 0.139 0.113 0.108 0.216 0.149 0.096 0.266
BA-BE 0.120 0.110 0.112 0.190 0.172 0.169 0.154
AB-AE 0.133 0.110 0.110 0.214 0.152 0.097 0.261
AB-BE 0.118 0.114 0.108 0.193 0.170 0.173 0.158
AE-BE 0.093 0.700 0.083 0.146 0.084 0.070 0.122
Table III indicates that at least one secret key bit, which
will be the same at Alice and Bob, can be generated out of
the 8 bit RSS value. However, this will be more difficult for
the indoor scenario 3 where Eve is visible for both Alice and
Bob, who do not see each other. Because of the fast(er) varying
body-to-body channel in this specific scenario, the correlation
and, hence, MI between RSSAB and RSSBA is lower. However,
the correlation is expected to be higher if the round-trip
time between Alice and Bob could be decreased. The mutual
information shared with Eve is, in all scenarios, significantly
lower than the mutual information between legitimate parties
Alice and Bob. This implies that, even when the MI equals
(maximally) 0.266 as in outdoor scenario 3, Eve is not able
to estimate one secret bit that is shared by Alice and Bob
[8]. Therefore, the unique received RSS sequences at Alice
and Bob are proven very suitable for secret key generation for
both indoor and outdoor WBANs.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
In this work, we have analyzed the correlation, entropy
and mutual information of RSS streams, collected using wire-
less on-body sensor nodes, between two mobile legitimate
parties, Alice and Bob, and a stationary evesdropper, Eve.
These statistics, calculated for three indoor and four outdoor
measurements, show that stream of RSS values could be used
to create joint randomness between two mobile legitimate
parties, Alice and Bob. The generated secret key will be
(largely) unknown to a stationary intruder, called Eve, owing
to the significantly smaller mutual information between the
RSS values, received by Alice of Bob, and the RSS values
received by Eve. Moreover, the mutual information between
Alice and Bob is maximized when both the correlation and
entropy are high. From our measurements, higher correlation is
obtained for the outdoor measurement scenarios because of the
smaller level crossing rate, indicating a larger coherence time.
However, correlation in the indoor scenarios is expected to be
higher if the round-trip time between Alice and Bob could be
decreased. Additionally, due to the non-uniform distribution
of potential scatterers in close vicinity of Alice and Bob in
the outdoor measurement scenario, the distribution of the RSS
values between two legitimate parties is broader, compared to
the indoor RSS values for the same measurement scenario.
This implies that outdoor locations could introduce higher
entropy, compared to indoor scenarios, which lead to a higher
mutual information, assuming high correlation.
V. FUTURE WORK
Future work involves the implementation of the following
three algorithms to extract a high-level secret keys, with high
randomness, out of the RSS streams between Alice and Bob
[5], as also described in [8] for our indoor measurement
scenarios. First, data quantization drops RSS values proba-
bilistically, located between the RSS mean and the RSS mean
± threshold, to introduce higher entropy. This compensates
for assymetric system parameters, such as a slightly different
transmit power or receiver noise floor, at Alice and Bob.
Next, data reconciliation, potentially implemented by an (X,Y)
Hamming-code, ensures that the secret key, generated at both
legitimate parties, is equal. Finally, privacy amplification,
based on the ’leftover hash lemma’ can be used to extract
higher entropy secret keys when the output of the quantizer
produces low(er) entropy keys. Additionally, this work can
further be extended by measurements that consider a mobile
eavesdropper, placed on Bob’s (or Alice’s) body, correspond-
ing to the worst case scenario.
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